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1. INTRODUCTION
High-profile civil litigation is not just decided in the courts; it also is
decided in the court of public opinion. Courts and legal commentators are
increasingly recognizing that the media, through the way it covers litigation,
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has a very real impact on the resolution of individual lawsuits. Common sense
dictates that it is within a lawyer's role, therefore, to work with reporters on
their stories to ensure accurate reporting. Many defense attorneys in high-
profile cases, though, flinch at the idea of saying anything to reporters out of
concern that such conversations could be misconstrued as an attempt to affect
the jury pool or persuade a judge or jury. For this reason, rules and beliefs
have developed as to how lawyers may appropriately engage the media to
mitigate its impact on their clients.
Regardless of one's stand on an attorney's extrajudicial speech, there is a
general consensus that media coverage can affect a lawsuit in two broad ways.
First, the media can unduly influence the defenses, motions, and settlement
options that a defendant might consider.' This is particularly true if the
coverage has a negative crossover effect on a defendant's business, livelihood
or other important outside interest. Second, media coverage can change the
dynamics in the courtroom, so that when "trial lawyers make their arguments
before juries, heads nod in recognition of what was said during the media
campaign."2
Good plaintiffs' lawyers understand this nexus and have adopted litigation
techniques to maximize their leverage. In the game of high-profile corporate
litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers will use the media as a vehicle through which
they run their triple pressure point litigation play: (1) driving up the costs of
the litigation, (2) driving down stock prices, and (3) vilifying the company
among consumers and potential juries. To avoid this unfair disadvantage,
many corporate and high profile individual defendants settle cases under the
theory that a "bad settlement is better than a good lawsuit'"3 - a flawed
resolution of a case that, when viewed collectively, tarnishes the American
civil justice system.
In these situations, working with the media to create more balanced,
accurate, and less sensational coverage of a lawsuit is a necessary element in
I For example, at the early stages of the Baycol litigation, the lead plaintiffs' lawyer,
Mikal Watts, said that he purposefully worked the court of public opinion: "I was feeding a
lot of information to European and U.S. papers ... It was part of my strategy to affect the
stock price, which I was very successful at." The article notes that "nervous investors bail-
ing out of its stock kept driving up the cost" of the litigation. Monica Langley, Courtroom
Triage: Bayer, Pressed to Settle a Flood of Suits Over Drug, Fights Back, WALL ST. J., May
3, 2004, at A 1.
2 Steven B. Hantler, Trial By Newswire, LITIG. MGMT., Summer 2003, at 17 ("In short,
the trial lawyers have blurred, to the point of elimination, the lines that traditionally sepa-
rated the courtroom; product and service marketing; and customer, public, and shareholder
relations.").
3 Interview by Daryn Kagan, CNN Anchor, with Kendall Coffey, CNN Commentator
(CNN television broadcast, Nov. 12, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/transcripts/031-
1/12/bn.03.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (quoting Mr. Coffey).
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defending high profile defendants. But most attorneys are not trained in public
relations. Further, their attention generally is and should be focused on the
more traditional aspects of lawyering, such as discovery, motion practice, and
trying the case. To fill this void, there are people who have become skilled in
litigation communications. These experts, and not the trial counsel themselves,
often are the more appropriate personnel to analyze coverage, anticipate how
legal defenses will come across in the media, and offer strategic advice as to
how to protect the litigant's legal interests in the media coverage.
Attorneys should have the freedom to hire those who practice litigation
communications so they can represent their clients productively inside and
outside the courtroom. In order for an attorney to do this in a way that
provides the greatest value for the client, courts would have to extend the
rubric of privileged communications to those outside communications experts.
The problem, however, is that the law has only begun to develop as to whether
the attomey-client privilege and work product doctrine apply, and if so, when
they apply, to those who provide litigation communications services.
Currently, this uncertainty is discouraging lawyers from employing these
experts effectively. As this article will show, hiring litigation communications
experts can be an essential tool in the proper representation of a client in
litigation.
This article first examines the current nature of high-stakes civil litigation, in
particular, how the media inherently favors plaintiffs and, consequently, how
plaintiffs' attorneys use the media to their advantage.4 It next addresses the
common misconception that defense attorneys should not publicly respond to
negative publicity or outright attacks on their clients in the media for fear of
violating state ethics rules. Not only is such an attitude akin to an ostrich
burying its head in the sand, it can harm a client's litigation position, and as
some suggest, be a breach of one's responsibility to that client.'
This article then examines several recent court decisions in this quickly
developing area of law. Of particular importance is a June 2003 ruling by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which
became the first court to extend the attorney-client and work product privileges
to include outside litigation communications specialists who assist attorneys in
providing legal services.6 In so doing, the learned Southern District Judge
4 Although this Article focuses on corporate civil defendants, much of the analysis pre-
sented is equally applicable to defendants in criminal trials.
5 Debra S. Katz et al., Extrajudicial Statements: Lawyers' Ethical Obligations in Com-
municating with the Press, SH039 ALI-ABA 1015, 1023-1024 (Dec. 1999).
6 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury




Kaplan joined a growing number of courts that acknowledge public relations
can be a necessary element in litigating a case and in achieving more accurate
results from the legal system.' The Article concludes that courts should follow
the lead of the Southern District of New York and extend the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine to litigation communications specialists as
non-testifying experts This will better permit high-profile defendants and
their lawyers to counter negative coverage in the media and provide all the
parties that could affect the result of the lawsuit with a balanced understanding
of the case.
I1. THE SPECIAL CHALLENGE OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY FOR
DEFENDANTS
A. Pro-Plaintiff Media Bias
Litigation involving well-known companies or individuals always has
grabbed the attention of the news media, especially when it involves
sensational charges. The magnitude of the coverage and the filter through
which the media reports on litigation can create a "clear plaintiff bias in civil
cases."9 While small companies can find themselves under the media spotlight
in a particularly novel or "bet the company" suit, the media tends to focus on
allegations against established and respected corporate defendants.'" These
larger companies tend to have household names, and allegations against them
can make good "copy" - even if the allegations are seemingly spurious,
commonplace or unproven." The same is true for litigation involving celebrity
defendants. 2
In covering litigation, particularly corporate litigation, the media has an
inherent bias that favors plaintiffs. When charges are made public, the media
7 Id. at 330-31; see infra Part IV, C.
8 In the historic analysis of legal ethics, the appropriateness of extrajudicial speech and
determinations in whether to extend privileges to non-testifying experts, courts have not dis-
tinguished between criminal and civil litigation. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F.
Supp.2d at 327-328.
9 Dirk C. Gibson & Mariposa E. Padilla, Litigation Public Relations Problems and Lim-
its, PUB. REL. REv., 215, 216 (Jun. 22 1999) (citing Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The
Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1991)).
10 John K. Villa, Privilege and PR Firms, 19 No. 7 ACCA DOCKET 88, 91-92
(July/August 2001).
Id. at88.
12 See, e.g., Paul Pringle, Hush-Hush High-Profile Cases: Dome of Silence Caps Celeb-
rity Cases, Authorities: It's in Defendants' Best Interests, L.A.TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004, at Al
(citing a lawyer as saying, "There seems to be an insatiable appetite for these trials.").
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automatically reverts to the basic elements of story telling and casts the lawsuit
in traditional protagonist-antagonist terms. 3 The defendant, simply by being
on the wrong side of the "v," becomes the "villain" to the plaintiffs "victim,"
whether or not the actual charges have any factual basis or legal merit. Reports
frequently lead with the plaintiffs injury or allegations and only include the
corporate position as a response. 4 These stories rarely are counterbalanced by
positive stories about the defending company. Because companies would
rather not draw attention to any litigation, they usually do not seek publicity
for their victories. Even if they did, reporters often do not see corporate
litigation victories as particularly newsworthy. Goliath is supposed to beat
David; that is not news."
Furthermore, the corporate defendant's position often is given scant
attention in news coverage, and, when included, usually comes across as
defensive. 6 Corporate defendants are placed in the position of having to prove
the "nonnegative" in an effort to exculpate themselves - something that is very
difficult to do when an unpopular defendant, particularly with science-based
defenses, is juxtaposed with a grieving plaintiff who is legitimately and
gravely injured. So, "how, without appearing callous, can a company argue in
the court of public opinion that a plaintiffs child died because he misused the
product, not because the product was defective?"' 7
Not surprisingly, this inherent media bias has a direct impact on the public's
perception of corporate lawsuits - a difficult situation that is exacerbated by
13 Phil Goldberg, Facing Antitrust Action? Who's Handling Your Media?, METRO.
CORP. CorNs., Dec. 2000, at 42.
14 See, e.g., William Sherman, Two Class-action Lawsuits are Filed Against Major New
York Modeling Agencies, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Feb. 29, 2004 (mentioning defendant's posi-
tion for first time in ninth paragraph in a forty-two paragraph article); Bruce V. Bigelow,
New Lawsuit Focus on Stock Trading by Top Executives at Peregrine Systems, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 2004 (providing defendant's position in just three of the first twenty-
two paragraphs); Chris Stirewalt, Asbestos Trial Focuses on Carbide; Lawyers Exchange
Opening Statements, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 2002, at IA (stating that on the day
of opening arguments, the nineteen-paragraph article focused nearly entirely on plaintiffs
argument, mentioning defendant's position only in paragraphs nine through fourteen); Peter
B. Lord, White House Battles Paint Companies in Lead Case, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 15,
2001, at A3 (leading with attorney general's arguments and using companies' position as a
rebuttal).
15 As just one example, a Westlaw search shows that when a jury returned a verdict for
$58.5 million dollars against Chrysler in Debbs v. Chrysler Corp. in 1999, many of the na-
tion's daily newspapers covered the verdict and the allegations. When a Pennsylvania ap-
pellate court overturned that verdict in October 2002, the decision received scant coverage,
which was mostly contained to legal trade publications. 810 A.2d 137 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002).





the reluctance of corporate defendants, in particular, to speak with the media.
According to a 2002 public opinion survey, 62% of Americans believe a
corporation's "no comment" about a lawsuit means that company is covering
up wrongdoing. 8 It is more likely, however, that defense lawyers simply are
adhering to the antiquated notion that. "lawyers do not try their cases in the
media."' 9 These lawyers may fear that a judge could misconstrue setting the
record straight as an attempt to improperly influence the lawsuit, or worse, a
risk that could lose their client's attorney-client privilege for documents shared
with litigation communications experts. °
B. Plaintiff Use of Pro-Plaintiff Media Bias
Plaintiffs' attorneys have long understood this media bias and have become
experts at using their media advantage to their legal gain.2' Certain personal
injury lawyers, for example, have admitted that they purposefully and
systematically set out to discredit businesses and their products before, during,
and after trials in order to raise the stakes for the litigation.- In some
Is Julia Hood, 'No Comment' Won't Cut it, Finds Survey, PR WEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, at 3
(quoting Harlan Loeb, director of Hill & Knowlton's litigation support operation as saying,
"This survey points out the glaring void between saying little and exposing yourself to the
perception of liability, and articulating a clear and linear story...").
19 Richard M. Kerger, Dealing with the Media, 26 LIT. 4,41 (Summer 2000) ("A lawyer
from the old school might ignore the message or tell the producer 'no comment.' From his
traditional point of view, there is nothing to be gained from an interview. The journalist is a
shark, and the lawyer and his client are nothing more than tasty tidbits."); see, e.g., Gregory
J. Wilcox, Ralph's Hit With Lawsuit: Hiring Practices Broke Law, Union Says, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 3, 2004, at BI (citing Ralph's spokesman as saying that it is company policy
"not to comment on lawsuits"); Carrie Melago & Robert Gearty Go Ahead for Lawsuits,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 10, 2003, at 24 (citing a Port Authority spokesperson as saying "it
was agency policy not to comment on litigation"); Charles S. Johnson, McGrath Sues 15
Energy Companies, BILLINGS GAZETTE, July 2, 2003, at BI (citing an Avista spokesperson
as saying that the "company's standing policy is not to comment about lawsuits"); Dan
Strempel, Executive Search Firm Sues UBS Warburg for $2.1 million, FAIRFIELD Co. Bus.
J., Mar. 24, 2003, at 6 (citing UBS Warburg spokesperson as saying that "the company's
policy is not to comment on any litigation"); Court Briefs, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 19,
2001, at A3 (citing defendant as saying, "It's our policy not to specifically address issues
that are part of lawsuits.").
20 See Michael Dore & Rosemary Ramsay, Dealing with Public Relations Concerns in
Products Liability and Toxic Tort Litigation, 213 N.J. LAW. 52, 52 (2002) (noting that
"courts have often been overtly hostile to litigants' public relations concerns.").
21 See Villa, supra note 10, at 88.
22 John Coale, The Public Policy Implications of Lawsuits Against Unpopular Defen-
dants: Guns, Tobacco, Alcohol and What Else, Address Before The Federalist Society on
Law and Public Policy Studies (Nov. 11, 1999), at http://www.fed-soc.org/Public-
ations/practicegroupnewsletters/civilrights/firearms-civv3i3.htm ("We take these cases, such
as tobacco - back in 1994, and then put together a three-pronged attack, legal, media, and
political. We attacked on these three fronts for five years until they folded and settled.")
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instances, the plaintiffs' lawyers will only file a lawsuit after the target
defendant is made unpopular - through massive public relations efforts and,
sometimes, political hearings.23 The plaintiffs' lawyers know that many
companies have low thresholds for negative publicity and its effect on
consumers, employees and investors, and, therefore, will settle claims if the
pressure gets too high.24 For the cases that do not settle, the media can have an
impact on the way judges and juries perceive the litigants as well as the
underlying issues, such as science, class certifications, protective orders, and
the right of companies to assert their privileges in discovery proceedings.
Some plaintiffs' firms have been known to hire in-house public relations staff,
while others use plaintiff-oriented litigation communications consultants.
Observers of this kind of high-stakes, high-profile litigation have noted that, as
a result of the widespread use of public relations by plaintiffs' firms,
"[1]itigation blackmail is being committed in the United States every day.., in
an obvious attempt to generate public sympathy and apply pressure on [civil]
defendants."2
C. The Media's Impact on Litigation
Studies of pretrial publicity show that "even modest pretrial publicity can
prejudice potential jurors against a defendant."26 In fact, one study showed that
"pretrial knowledge was the best predictor of prejudgment": 80% of jurors
exposed to prejudicial articles found against the defendant, compared with only
39% of those who were not exposed to pretrial publicity.27 As common sense
(transcript on file with authors); see also Hantler, supra note 2, at 16 (quoting a trial lawyer
from a report in The New Yorker as saying, "A lot of what we discussed was how to talk
about the [issue] to the general public. This is a war that has lots of fronts. One of the
fronts is the battle for the hearts and minds of the American people.").
23 Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Regulation Through Litigation Has Just Begun:
What You Can Do To Stop It, in BRIEFLY 19 (Nat'l Legal Center for the Pub. Interest, Nov.
1999) ("[P]ersonal injury lawyers launch their efforts by first vilifying a potential defendant
through massive public relations efforts. Then they may use political allies to conduct hear-
ings and provide further ammunition to make the potential defendant unpopular. Only then
do they file a lawsuit.").
24 Hantler, supra note 2, at 16; see also Phil Goldberg, Courts Should Keep Media
Abuse Out of Litigation, 167 N.J.L.J. 259, 23 (2002).
25 John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers' Duty to Balance News
Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 77, 89 (2002).
26 Gibson & Padilla, supra note 9, at 216 (quoting Gary Moran & Brian L. Cutler, The
Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 345 (1991)); see
also Pringle, supra note 12, at A9 ("Judges overseeing celebrity trials often issue gag orders
and seal court documents to help keep media coverage from influencing jury decisions.").
27 Gibson & Padilla, supra note 9, at 216 (citing A. Padawer-Singer & A.H. Barton, The
Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Verdicts, in Rita J. Simon (ed.), THE JURY SYSTEM: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 125 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishers, 1975)).
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would suggest, judicial instructions to disregard media coverage "did not
reduce the impact of pretrial publicity."28 Perhaps this is why the media often
is seen as a "substantial factor" in the escalation of corporate litigation, such as
the breast implant suits, which were largely successful despite the fact that the
science behind the accusations was later discredited. 9 It sometimes can take
the facts and the law several years to catch up to sensational headlines.
Judges also are not immune from outside influences. As is evidenced by
polling data and other studies, the judges can be, and sometimes are,
influenced by public opinion and the media.30 The U.S. Supreme Court
identified this problem when it observed that judges are "subject to the same
psychological reactions as laymen ... [I]t is difficult to remain oblivious to the
pressures that the news media can bring to bear on them both directly and
through the shaping of public opinion."'" The ABA's Reardon Committee
reached a similar conclusion when it reviewed the potential effect of media
bias on the judges in the 1960s: "It is essential that the public official...
maintain his objectivity and impartiality. Under sustained pressure from the
news media ... this may prove impossible."32
Given the impact of pretrial publicity on those who decide lawsuits, it is in
the best interest for the courts, in their pursuit of a fair and balanced litigation
result, to allow defendants the ability to use litigation communications. It is
important that defense lawyers have the ability to respond effectively to
publicity that adversely affects their client's interests. Should defense
attorneys remain silent, the plaintiffs' attorneys and pro-plaintiff groups that
regularly engage the media could have an undue and disproportionate
28 Gibson & Padilla, supra note 9, at 216.
29 Dore & Ramsay, supra note 20, at 52; See also, Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber,
JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS, 257-59 (1997) (not-
ing flood of Bendectin and breast implant lawsuits based on "specious scientific evidence");
Richard Hazelton, Rule of Law: The Tort Monster That Ate Dow Corning, WALL ST. J., May
17, 1995, A21 (noting that Dow Coming, the leading breast implant manufacturer, filed for
Chapter II protection in 1995 as a result of lawsuits spurred by faulty expert studies).
30 Robert A. Hillman, The 'New Conservatism' in Contract Law And The Process of
Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879,884 (1999) (arguing that "judges allow public opinion to
influence decisions..."). As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the media and the pub-
lic opinion it helps shape are "effective restraint[s] on "possible abuse of judicial power...
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other
checks are of small account." Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991)
(citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948)).
31 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1965).
32 Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of
Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1821 (1995) (quoting ABA, STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 77 (1966) and observing that "[e]ven judges...
might be influenced by publicity").
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influence on the litigation.33
Ill. THE ETHICAL ROLE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS TO COUNTER
NEGATIVE PUBLICITY
While most Americans, and most lawyers, probably would agree that it is
best to have a judicial system insulated from outside influence, it is impossible
to remove the court system from our larger society. The question for the legal
community, then becomes, what is the best way to reduce the effects of media
bias on individual suits? A core tenet of the American legal system always has
been that the parties have the greatest stake in ensuring that justice is achieved
in the courts. It follows, then, that countering pro-plaintiff bias in the media is
the obligation of the defendants. Defendants and their lawyers, therefore,
should be permitted to use the appropriate tools to help the media develop
more complete stories about legal matters of public interest. In fact, legal
ethics rules have been migrating in that direction.
Over the past forty years, there has been a change in the perception of
whether legal ethics rules permit defense attorneys to talk with the media if
media reports show a bias against their clients. Those who favor defending
clients in the media are engaged in a fierce tug-of-war with those who adhere
to the notion that lawyers do not "try their cases in the media."34 The latter
group is most influenced by the traditional notion of the "gentlemanly"
practice of law. 5 They may argue that extrajudicial speech can prejudice a
judicial proceeding and, therefore, trumps a lawyer's or corporation's First
Amendment right to free speech.36
This hesitation, though, is misplaced, and the rationale is inverted. A
33 "The [I]nternet's unprecedented speed and reach created a powerful platform for
plaintiff law firms, activist groups, and others to recruit plaintiffs and influence opinion at
the grassroots level." Karen Doyne, Litigation PR Vital to Winning in Court of Public
Opinion, PR WEEK, Mar. 22, 2004, at 8. It is common for sensitive documents to turn up on
websites, such as thesmokinggun.com long before they are considered in court. Id.
34 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
35 Catherine Cupp Theisen, The New Model Rule 3.6: An Old Pair of Shoes, 44 U. KAN.
L. REV. 837, 840 (1996) (noting that the first ethical guidelines were written in 1908 by the
American Bar Association against public statements in the media as a means of letting non-
ABA lawyers understand "how to practice law like gentlemen").
36 Id. at 838-39. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court firmly
established the applicability of First Amendment rights to corporate speech. 435 U.S. 765
(1978). In striking down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from attempting
to influence ballot referenda that did not relate directly to their business, Justice Powell, de-
livering the opinion of the Court, stated, "If the speakers here were not corporations, no one
would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech
indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech
comes from a corporation rather than an individual." Id. at 777.
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criminal client's right to a fair trial and effective counsel under the Sixth
Amendment is the policy basis for the "public right of reply" that bar
associations have recognized, particularly as applied to defense lawyers, in
their ethics rules.37 In fact, the Supreme Court has accepted that making sure
potential jury pools have access to accurate, balanced coverage during pre-trial
publicity is a legitimate endeavor for litigation communications.38 In high-
profile cases, the only way some lawyers can offer clients their Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, therefore, is to set the record straight in the
media in hopes that accurate reporting will create a neutral litigation
environment.39 The precise public policy reasons that protect a criminal
defendant's right to seek fair coverage in the media apply to defendants in
high-profile civil trials, especially when punitive damages or individual
reputations and livelihoods are at stake in a case."
A. Origins of Attorney Ethics Rules on Extrajudicial Speech
In the 1960s, the courts initially provided significant ammunition against
allowing lawyers their right to extrajudicial speech. These rulings responded
to the media circuses surrounding President Kennedy's death and the murder
charges against Dr. Sam Sheppard in Ohio. The Warren Report strongly
denounced the wide availability in the media of significant details of President
Kennedy's assassination, stating that had Lee Harvey Oswald survived, it
would have been unlikely that he could have received a fair trial.4" At around
the same time, the Supreme Court overturned the murder conviction of
Dr. Sheppard (who later became the subject of the movie "The Fugitive")
because the media created significant public prejudice against the defendant.42
31 Watson, supra note 25, at 96 ("The right-of-reply concept was grounded in the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial and the recognition that defense attorneys should not
be expected to stand silently while reports in the media damaged their clients' prospects of
winning...").
38 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1039-40, 1058 (1991).
39 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury
Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323-34, 326 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
40 See Interview by Kagan with Coffey, supra note 3 ("If you win $20 million in court
and lose a lifetime of earnings and success and impact throughout the community and
throughout the nation, then the litigation pales in comparison, obviously, to [Rosie
O'Donnell's] public impact and public presence.").
41 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY 238-40, at http://www.archives.gov/research_room/jfk/warrencommission/warr-
encommissionreport chapter5.html (noting that extensive media coverage, which di-
vulged evidence and included statements that might not have been admissible at trial, en-
dangered Oswald's constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury).
42 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
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In issuing its decision, the Court recognized that "[c]ollaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial
is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of
disciplinary measures."43
In response to these opinions, the American Bar Association formed the
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press to promulgate new ABA
rules on trial publicity.44 The Committee's report led to the adoption of ABA's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-107, in 1969.45
The rule, which was adopted in most states, said that in civil actions an
attorney could not make extrajudicial statements, other than a quotation from
public records, if it reflected on the character or credibility of a witness or
party, expressed an opinion on the merits of the claims or defenses of a party,
or "[a]ny other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the
action. ' 46  Lawyers were fairly tightly gagged in their interactions with the
media.
B. Court Decisions Gradually Required Relaxation of the Prohibition
Starting in the 1970s, the judiciary began invalidating these rules as too
restrictive and violative of the First Amendment.47 In Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that a district court's "no-comment" rules, which barred
lawyers from making public comments about ongoing civil and criminal cases,
deprived litigants of their free speech rights under the First Amendment. 48 The
district court rule at issue, like Disciplinary Rule 7-107, prohibited extra-
judicial statements "if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination
will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of
justice. '49 The court held that "[o]nly those comments that pose a 'serious and
imminent threat' of interference with the fair administration of justice can be
constitutionally proscribed.""0  The court specifically recognized the
43 Id.
44 See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Tentative Draft
1966).
45 See Gabriel G. Gregg, Comment, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120: A Flawed
Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1133-34 (1996).
46 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(G) (2003).
47 See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar ofNevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1030-31 (1991) (citing In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948)); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242,
249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
48 Bauer, 522 F. 2d at 248-49.
49 Id. (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 249.
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importance and significance of attorney speech: "Since lawyers are considered
credible in regard to pending litigation in which they are engaged and are in
one of the most knowledgeable positions, they are a crucial source of
information and opinion."'
The ABA tried to accommodate Bauer by adopting Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6 in 1983, which authorized sanctions for attorney
speech that produced a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding" and prohibited attorneys from discussing information
likely to be inadmissible at trial.52 There remained, however, an overriding
principle disfavoring extrajudicial speech, and it was still considered
unlawyerly to advocate in the media.
The view that extrajudicial attorney statements could be proper, particularly
when made by defense counsel, received a boost in the 1991 Supreme Court
case Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada." The case involved Dominic Gentile, an
attorney in Nevada, who held a press conference "[h]ours after his client was
indicted on criminal charges."54 Gentile, who reviewed the applicable Nevada
ethics code,55 determined that unless some of the weaknesses in the State's case
were made public, "a potential jury venire would be poisoned by repetition in
the press of information being released by the police and prosecutors."6 While
Gentile "sought only to counter publicity already deemed prejudicial,"57 the
Nevada Bar found him in violation of a disciplinary rule prohibiting the
dissemination of information that has a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," and issued a private reprimand.58
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1991 decision, struck down the Nevada
ethics rule for vagueness. In delivering a portion of the Court's opinion,
Justice Kennedy laid a marker for the right of lawyers to use extrajudicial
51 Id. at 250. This observation was later quoted by the Supreme Court. Gentile, 501
U.S. at 1056. The court in Bauer was particularly concerned with the right of a plaintiffs'
lawyer to make public statements on behalf of his or her client to balance the ability of
nonlawyer representatives of public or private defendants to comment on the case in the
media. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258.
52 See Gregg, supra note 45, at 1337 (emphasis added).
53 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
54 Id. at 1033.
55 NEV. SUPREME COURT RULE 177 was substantively identical to the ABA's MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6, and prohibited an attorney from making "an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substan-
tial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," with certain specified
exceptions. Id.
56 Id. at 1042.
57 Id.
58 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S, 1030, 1033-34 (1991).
59 Id. at 1034.
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statements to seek a just legal result. Justice Kennedy stated,
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door . . . Just as an attorney may
recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse consequences of a possi-
ble loss after trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's reputa-
tion ... including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client
does not deserve to be tried.6°
In 1994, the ABA formalized this opinion by drafting ethics rules supporting
the right of lawyers to defend their clients in public.6' It modified Rule 3.6 to
add a "right of reply" so that lawyers would feel free to respond to
"particularly egregious publicity without fear of sanction. '62 Now, ABA rules
clearly recognize that a lawyer acts within his or her professional responsibility
when making "a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required
to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent
publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. '63 In recognition
that individual lawsuits often involve larger legal and public policy issues, the
ABA also acknowledged that representing a client may extend beyond legal
issues "to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."'
As these cases and the development of ethics rules indicate, hesitation by
some defense lawyers to engage the media to mitigate plaintiff bias is
misplaced. 5 Working to ensure accurate coverage to minimize the media's
impact on litigation is distinguished from waging a "smear campaign" against
a litigation opponent, something the authors of this article certainly would not
endorse. Rather, the type of litigation communications activities that would
benefit from the attorney-client privilege and are discussed in this article
generally deal with the defendant's conduct and the defendant's internal
documents and strategies. In those areas, the capacity of lawyers to be
60 Id. at 1043.
61 See Gregg, supra note 45, at 1346.
62 See id. at 1382.
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (2003) provides that, notwithstanding
the general prohibition on lawyers making extrajudicial statements that might have a sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding, "a lawyer may
make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from
the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the
lawyer's client. Statements made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such infor-
mation as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity." Id.
64 Id. at R. 2. 1.
65 Defense attorneys often seek protective orders to govern the litigation. These attor-
neys may be reticent to engage the media and try to secure a protective order in order to stop
the other parties from using the media to their advantage. In recent years, judges in high
profile cases "appear to be increasingly willing to impose gag orders." Frederick P. Hafetz
et al., Gag Orders: Legal and Practical Issues Confronting the Media, 605 PRACTICING L.
INST. 239, 245 (2000) (including a detailed discussion on the history of protective orders and
the types of protective orders courts issue).
20041
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
advocates for their clients among the public has solidified."
IV. THE LITIGATION COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALIST
Communicating with the media in high profile, pressurized situations is a
specialized skill, just like accounting, science and other areas in which lawyers
are permitted to consult - confidentially - with outside experts. As with any
other area of law requiring specialized skill, lawyers should be able to consult
with those skilled in litigation communications to help them perform the
media-related aspects of their jobs.67 As Judge Kaplan from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York recognized, lawyers are
not necessarily capable or experienced at public relations.68 Skills for handling
the media are not regularly taught in law school, are not generally considered
in hiring corporate counsel, and are not relevant to many of the issues and
cases that corporate law departments face. During the 1990s, after Gentile v.
Nevada,69 and several high-profile civil and criminal cases, a number of public
relations professionals recognized the need for such skills and began
specializing in litigation communications."
In the last decade or so, an "entire industry of legal public relations
66 While these rules may evolve further, it is unlikely that they would return to a more
restrictive role for attorneys, as "every major trial publicity rule introduced before 1994 has
been invalidated by some court as overly restrictive of lawyers' First Amendment rights."
Gregg, supra note 45, at 1323. Some commentators have called for different rules regarding
plaintiffs and prosecutors as opposed to defendants. See, e.g., Max Stern, The Right of the
Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53, 120-21 (1983). Others have
viewed litigation public relations as so central to a defense that they have advocated that
legal aid societies offer communications counsel. See, e.g., Gibson & Padilla, supra note 9,
at 220 (citing statements by Richard Stack, an attorney and professor of public communica-
tion at The American University in Washington, D.C.). Either way, it is well settled that
lawyers have a right, and potentially an obligation, to consider these extrajudicial factors.
See Ryan Brett Bell & Paula Odysseos, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and Court TV? How Amer-
ica 's Increasing Interest in Trial Publicity Impacts Our Lawyers and the Legal System, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 653, 669 (2002) ("The ultimate duty of an attorney is to serve the
needs of her client, which often necessitates taking extrajudicial factors into account when
planning a litigation strategy."); John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers'
Duty to Balance New Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 77, 82 (2002) (sug-
gesting that attorneys could face malpractice suits for not advocating in the media if not do-
ing so puts the client at a negative litigation position).
67 Molly McDonough, Lawyers' Talks With PR Agents Privileged, Judge Says, 2 NO. 23
A.B.A. J. E-REP. 1, 1 (Jun. 13, 2003) (quoting Martha Stewart's attorney, Robert G. Mor-
villo, as stating, "We are moving into a modern world [where] it is simply imperative that
lawyers have access to this kind of assistance.").
68 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury Wit-
ness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
69 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
70 Moses, supra note 32, at 1829.
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consultants" has developed specifically for the purpose of counseling and
helping lawyers - both defense and plaintiffs' attorneys - handle the media.7
Indeed, several books have been written on this topic and most large public
relations and public affairs firms include litigation communications as a
specialty area." Part of what makes litigation public communication different
from "regular public relations" is that the practitioners generally are not
charged with disseminating or "pitching" stories.73 Rather, they help manage
the news, work with reporters to understand the litigation process and the
significance of legal rulings and motions, and provide clients with strategic
counsel as to how to respond to certain attacks.74 As one practitioner in
corporate defense litigation communications noted, "Litigation PR is not for
the kids. The hazards are too great. It can re-do a company or end a
company."75
What makes litigation communications specialists "experts" is that, in
addition to being fluent in media relations, they have an understanding of the
legal world.76 This skill requires the ability to understand and translate legalese
into simple terms and concepts that the public can comprehend. Speaking with
the press in the midst of litigation demands a comprehension of legal
procedures and doctrines; with corporate litigation, it also necessitates
familiarity with restrictions on corporate communications. For example,
unlike plaintiffs' attorneys, corporate lawyers are restricted by securities law in
how and when they discuss issues material to a company's financial standing.77
71 Id.; see also Anita Chabria, Litigation PR Gets a Boost in Time of Corporate Scandal,
PR WEEK, Nov. 25, 2002, at 3 ("The string of recent corporate scandals has elevated litiga-
tion PR to a new level of acceptance and use among lawyers and their clients...").
72 See e.g., JAMES F. HAGGERTY, Esq. IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION: WINNING YOUR
CASE WITH PUBLIC RELATIONS (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003); RICHARD STACK, COURTS,
COUNSELORS & CORRESPONDENTS: A MEDIA ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1998); LITIGATION PUBLIC RELATIONS: COURTING PUBLIC OPINION (Susanne
A. Roschwalb & Richard A. Stack, eds., 1995); JAMES LUKASZEWSKI, THE NEWEST
DISCIPLINE: MANAGING LEGALLY DRIVEN ISSUES (Lukaszewski Group 1995).
73 Dore & Ramsay, supra note 20, at 53-54.
74 Id.
75 Rebecca Flass, Could What You Spin Be Used Against You?, PR WEEK, Oct. 4, 1999,
at 9.
76 "Relatively few [public relations practitioners] under[stand] the basics of the legal
system or the dynamics of communications during litigation. PR people who failed to know
and respect the lawyer's mindset found themselves talking to brick walls. In the worst
cases, public statements or other actions did real damage to the party's legal position."
Karen Doyne, Litigation PR Vital to Winning in Court of Public Opinion, PR WEEK, Mar.
22, 2004, at 8.
77 See, e.g., Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34,47276, 17 CFR pt. 205 (2003) (summarizing the Securities &
Exchange Commission's adoption of conduct rules for attorneys appearing before the
Commission who represent issuers).
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The new Sarbanes-Oxley rules subject those statements to even further
scrutiny."8 The Securities and Exchange Commission already has charged at
least one company with violating securities law for issuing potentially
misleading public statements about pending legal matters.79
In addition, corporate lawyers, at least for the time being, are bound by the
rules of advertising, even in their statements made during crisis or litigation."
Therefore, statements need to be clear and accurate when discussing corporate
policies or products. Especially at the outset of a litigation issue, this can be
difficult, as companies often have to gather information about the issue while
simultaneously trying to give consumers and investors guidance.8 ' When
plaintiffs' lawyers are not held to this same standard for accuracy, responding
to their charges can be particularly challenging for companies because, as the
authors have experienced, the first few news cycles can determine the way the
public, and eventually the jurors and judges, view a company's culpability.
Finally, many cases involving corporate defendants are governed by case-
specific protective orders that prohibit certain types of communications.82
Litigation communications specialists need to understand the nuances of
how protective orders work. In sum, lawyers need litigation communications
experts who understand these rules and have experience operating within them
so that, given today's shortened news cycles,83 they can respond quickly,
accurately and effectively when litigation developments occur.
78 Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, PRNEws, Dec. 15, 2003, available at 2003 WL 7816298.
79 Patrick A. Tuite, Court Recognizes 'Patient-Spin Doctor' Privilege, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jul. 9, 2003, at 5..
80 This proposition was challenged in Nike Inc. v. Kasky, but the case settled after the
U.S. Supreme Court did not decide the case on the merits, finding that certiorari was im-
properly granted. 539 U.S. 534 (2003). As a result of the Court's inaction, the previous rul-
ing of the California Supreme Court stands and, therefore, all public statements about a
company's products and procedures, even if made in the midst of litigation or a crisis, can
be held to strict advertising standards. Id. While the ruling only applies to California, as a
practical matter, national companies will have to account for this ruling in their communica-
tions. Id.
81 See Jay G. Martin, Developing an Effective Crisis Management Plan for a Corpora-
tion, 65 TEX. B.J. 233,237 (2002); Mark Herrmann & Kim Kumiega, On Trial in the Courts
of Law and Public Opinion: The Tension Between Legal and Public Relations Advice, 28
No. 4 LITIG. 29, 31-32 (Summer 2002).
82 Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schulman, When Talk is Not Cheap: Communica-
tions With the Media, The Government, and Other Parties in High Profile White Collar
Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203,206-07 (2002).
83 It is the experience of the authors that in high-profile cases, the first news stories of
rulings and verdicts often are put on the newswires within an hour of the court's decision;
these articles generally set the basic framework for viewing the litigation development.
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V. EXTENDING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE TO LITIGATION COMMUNICATIONS
SPECIALISTS
At a very basic level, lawyers need to provide their public relations experts
with confidential information so that the public relations personnel can provide
advice in anticipation of potential media pitfalls, likely defenses and settlement
strategies. At the same time, public relations professionals need legal input so
they do not unwittingly curtail legal options specific to the case or issue at
hand. For example, the legal team must assess whether explanations included
in press statements could be misconstrued as admissions or whether certain
defenses could be precluded through poorly conceived press statements and
explanations."4 Full disclosure and coordination between lawyers and their
public relations counsel is necessary so that both may do their jobs well and
have a chance to enhance the administration of justice. 5
Given these realities of practicing law in corporate America, extending the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine to those who provide
litigation communications services is both appropriate and necessary. At the
conceptual level, this would institutionalize the right of companies to respond
to litigation issues, which could reduce the influence of extrajudicial
statements on the courts and allow courts to be honest brokers in the pursuit of
justice. That is because, at the technical level, extending the privilege would
remove one of the greatest obstacles corporate defendants face in deciding
whether to use litigation communications experts: the fear of inadvertently
waiving legal privileges over key client documents and allowing the public
relations and legal teams' thought processes and work product to be read and
used by opposing counsel.
A. The Basics of Privileged Communications
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice."86 The broad outlines of the attorney-client privilege are well-settled:
(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance permanently
84 Peter Gardner, Media at the Gates: Panic! Stress! Ethics?, 27 VT. B. J. 39 (2001).
85 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury Wit-
ness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
86 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor (8) except if
the protection is waived.87
It has been established that corporate clients have the same right to invoke
the attorney-client privilege as individual clients.88 Under the generally
accepted "subject matter" test for determining when attorney-client privilege
should apply in a corporate environment, the court asks "whether the
communication was for the purpose of seeking and rendering legal advice to
the corporation, whether the communication was made at the instance of the
employee's superior, and whether the subject matter was within the scope of
the employee's duties."89 The "control group" test, on the other hand, focuses
"on whether the communication was made by" employees who have a position
to take a substantial role in the legal affairs of the company.9" Communications
with outside counsel under these two theories, therefore, are protected under
attorney-client privilege.9 That privilege is not lost when outside counsel
shares those communications with agents and subordinates, such as clerks and
stenographers, who work "under the direct supervision and control of the
lawyer."92
The attorney work product doctrine is different from the attorney-client
privilege.93 The work product doctrine "is an intensely practical one, grounded
in the realities of litigation in our adversary system."94 Originally defined by
the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor,95 it protects materials prepared by or
at the behest of counsel in anticipation of litigation or for trial so that a lawyer
can have a "zone of privacy" in preparing and developing theories and strategy
"with an eye towards litigation."96
B. Application of the Privilege to Non-testifying Experts
Individuals who assist lawyers in providing legal assistance can be included
under the practitioner's attorney-client and work product privileges if certain
87 See Proposed Supreme Court Standard 503(a)(4), as cited in U.S. v. Spector, 793 F.2d
932, 938 (1986), cert. denied by 479 U.S. 1031, post-conviction relief denied by 888 F.2d
583; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 324; In re Cop-
per Market Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.R.D.213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
88 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 73-74 (3D ED. 1997) [hereinafter EPSTEIN].
89 Id. at 74.
90 Id.
9' Id.
92 Id. at 106 (citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2301, at 538 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
93 EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 297.
94 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
95 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
96 Id. at 510-11.
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criteria are met.97 In United States v. Kovel,9" the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit extended the attorney-client privilege to an
accountant hired by the lawyer to help him understand documents the client
provided so that he could render competent services to his client.99 The court
found that the presence of the nonlawyers was "necessary, or at least highly
useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which
the privilege is designed to permit."'' ° In order to qualify as a non-testifying
expert, therefore, the communication between the expert and the lawyer must
"be made in confidence for the purpose of [the client] obtaining legal advice
from the lawyer. If what is sought is not legal advice ... or if the advice
sought is the accountant's [or other professional] rather than the lawyer's, no
privilege exists."''
Courts have interpreted Kovel to protect the work0 2 of those employed "to
assist[] the lawyer in the rendition of legal services."'0 3 Under this philosophy,
the work of the non-testifying expert becomes entangled with the attorney's
own privileged work product, "thereby shielding the consulting expert's efforts
from discovery."'" As a result, the materials of non-testifying, consulting
experts are protected and prevented from introduction at trial. 5 These rulings
97 See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922-923 (2nd Cir. 1961). The Kovel doc-
trine applies only to non-testifying expert consultants. Expert witnesses, on the other hand,
may have to surrender their work product in anticipation of cross-examination.
98 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir. 1961).
99 Id. at 922.
00 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Michael J. O'Hara & Graham Mitenko, Scope of Discovery of an Expert's Work
Product, 10 J. LEGAL ECON. 37, 38-39 (2000). There is no separate privilege for experts. In
order for their work to be considered confidential, their privilege must be derived from the
attorney client privilege or work product doctrine. Id.
103 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury Wit-
ness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
Sup. Ct. Std. 503(a)(3), (b), reprinted in 3 Joseph M. McLaughlin, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §
503.01 (2d ed. 2003); People v. Spiezer, 316 Ill. App. 3d 75, 80 (2000) (stating that "many
jurisdictions have held that the reports prepared by the non-testifying, consulting experts are
protected from disclosure."); FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 109. A few courts, however, have narrowly interpreted Kovel to
only apply to those experts who help lawyers understand materials provided by the client,
such as interpreters. See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 140 (2" Cir. 1999);
see also United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071-72 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (following Ackert); In re G-1 Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 435-36 (D.N.J. 2003).
104 O'Hara & Mitenko, supra note 102, at 38-39.
105 The basis for the protection to non-testifying experts varies among the states. New
Jersey relied on the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. See State v. Mingo, 392
A.2d 590, 592-596 (N.J. 1978). Other courts have relied solely on work product doctrine.
See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650, 660 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Walker,
910 F. Supp. 861, 864 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). Some courts have merged the two doctrines. See,
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are consistent with Justice Powell's recognition in United States v. Nobles"°6
that the reality of modem litigation means that "attorneys often must rely on
the assistance of investigators and other agents" in doing their jobs. 7 As
Justice Powell further states, "the interests of society and the accused in
obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question ... demand that
adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each
side of the case."'' 0
C. Gradual Extension of Privilege to Litigation Communications Specialists
Only a handful of cases address the application of privilege to litigation
communications specialists. In a trademark case in 2000, Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, °9 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the extension of the privilege when a
corporation sought the advice of communication professionals."0 In that case,
the plaintiffs' outside counsel hired the company's existing public relations
firm to act as a consultant for "certain communications services in connection
with [the] representation" of the company."' The court found that the public
relations personnel were simply "strategizing about the effects of the litigation
on the client's customers, the media, or on the public generally.""' 2 The
significance of this case is that it demonstrates that courts may find that
ordinary public relations, as distinguished from litigation communications, do
not meet the criteria necessary to satisfy the work product doctrine. The
doctrine serves to "provide a zone of privacy for strategizing about the conduct
of litigation itself."' 13
One year later, the Southern District of New York again heard a case
affecting the application of privilege to litigation communications specialists.
In In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation,' 4 the court extended privilege to a
public relations firm, but not under the basis of the non-testifying expert
doctrine used in Kovel."' This case involved Sumitomo Corporation, a
e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046-47 (3rd Cir. 1975).
106 422 US 225 (1975).
107 Id. at 238.
108 Id.
109 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
''0 Id. at 54.
M Id.
112 Id. at 55.
"13 Id.
14 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
115 Id. at 219-220.
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Japanese company not skilled in dealing with the American media."6  The
company hired a crisis management public relations firm to handle media
allegations that it "conspired to manipulate global copper prices."'  The
consultant was privy to advice from the company's counsel, and "the legal
ramifications" of that advice "were material factors in the development of the
communications materials.""' 8  Because the foreign corporation hired the
litigation public relations firm directly, the court found that it was the
functional equivalent of an in-house department."9  It then applied the
principles of Upjohn Co. v. United States,2 ' which extend privilege to a
company's agents who possess "the relevant information the attorney needs to
render sound legal advice."2 ' The key in Copper Market Antitrust Litigation
was the legal nexus between the public relations advice and the litigation itself.
Finally, in 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia addressed a related issue in FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline.'" Unlike in
the previous two cases, the court was not presented with the question of
whether to cover the work product of the public relations firm. Rather, it
considered the narrower question of whether privilege would be lost simply
because otherwise privileged documents were shared with the litigation public
relations firm.' 23 In this case, GlaxoSmithKline had distributed otherwise
privileged information to specifically named public relations employees and
contractors on a "need to know basis.' 24  The court did not distinguish
between the company's public relations officials and those hired as outside
contractors.'25 It held that privilege was not surrendered because these
professionals were under the company's confidentiality agreements and
"needed to provide input to the legal department and/or receive the legal
advice and strategies formulated by counsel."'26
116 Id. at 215.
117 Id.118 Id. at 219.
119 In re Copper Market, 200 F.R.D at 218 (stating that "there was no reason to distin-
guish between persons on the corporation's payroll and the consultant").
120 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
121 Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
122 294 F.3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
123 See id. at 147.
124 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
125 See id. at 148 ("Our conclusion that the documents are protected by the attorney-
client privilege extends also to those communications that GSK shared with its public rela-
tions and government affairs consultants.").
126 Id. at 147.
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D. The Breakthrough Case: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A)
Grand Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, ' 7 Judge Kaplan of the
Southern District of New York extended privilege to litigation communication
specialists.'28 In that high-profile litigation, the plaintiff was the target of a
grand jury investigation initiated by the United States Attorney's office., 29
"The investigation of Target ha[d] been a matter of intense press interest and
extensive coverage for months."'" The attorney for the investigation's Target
hired litigation communications counsel "out of a concern that unbalanced and
often inaccurate press reports about [her] created a clear risk that the
prosecutors and regulators conducting the various investigations would feel
public pressure to bring some kind of charge against her."'' As the court
noted, the "firm's primary responsibility was defensive - to communicate with
the media in a way that would help restore balance and accuracy to the press
coverage."''
After addressing many of the developments in the ethics laws governing
extrajudicial speech, the court concluded that "attorney efforts to influence
public opinion in order to advance the client's legal position[s]" are legal
services 33 because it can be important to a defendant's "ability to achieve a fair
and just result" of the legal matter.'34 The district court noted that courts have
long recognized public relations efforts as a legitimate legal function and have
reimbursed court-appointed counsel in a number of instances for time spent
"hosting press conferences and performing other public relations" tasks in
connection with their representation.'35 It also noted that the common law
recognizes that the attorney-client and work product privileges in appropriate
circumstances extend to persons assisting the lawyer in the rendition of legal
services.36
Under the Kovel doctrine, as applied by the Southern District of New York,
classifying litigation communication professionals as non-testifying experts
extends both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine to the
127 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
128 Id. at 332.
129 Id. at 322.
130 Id. at 323.
131 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
132 In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (internal quotations omitted).
133 Id. at 326.
134 Id. at 330.
135 Id. at 327-28 (citing Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536,
1545 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 984
F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
136 In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d. at 325, 333.
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work performed by the litigation communications specialists.'37 According to
the In re Grand Jury holding, the privilege covers:
(I) confidential communications (2) between lawyers and public relations consultants (3)
hired by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with the media in cases such as this (4) that
are made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice (5) directed at handling the clients
legal problems are protected by the attorney-client privilege.'
38
The privilege also covers documents provided to the experts as well as those
materials the experts provide to the lawyers and clients.'39
The court recognized that if dealing with the media is part of lawyering in
high-profile cases, two truths become evident. First, lawyers should be able to
consult with litigation communications specialists to help them provide their
clients media-savvy legal advice. 4 Second, full and frank communication
among clients, lawyers and litigation communications specialists enhances the
administration of justice. 4 ' Litigation communications is a specialized
discipline within public relations. It, therefore, makes sense to classify these
practitioners as expert consultants, worthy of privileged communications.
Other courts should follow the lead set forth by the Southern District of New
York.
VI. RECOGNIZING, DEFINING, AND PROTECTING THE PRIVILEGE
WHEN APPLIED TO LITIGATION COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALISTS
As the cases previously discussed indicate, litigation communication
professionals who offer advice that enable attorneys to provide stronger legal
representation meet the Kovel standard. These specialists, therefore, should be
able to operate within the attorney-client and work product privileges enjoyed
by non-testifying experts in most jurisdictions. The underlying rationale of
these decisions dictates that in high-profile litigation:
(1) Legal representation includes media work;
(2) Lawyers are permitted to consult with outside experts in performing
these legal functions; and
(3) Unfettered coordination between lawyers and their litigation
communication experts is in the public interest.
137 Id. at 331-32.
138 Id. at 3 31.
139 See id. at 332-33.
140 Id. at 330.




A. Linking to the Litigation
The scope of litigation communications services covered by privilege, as
defined by In re Grand Jury, Gentile, and the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, are those activities meant to influence the judicial
system in a way to increase the likelihood of an accurate result. So, had the
potential defendant in the Southern District of New York case "simply...
gone out and hired Firm as public relations counsel," the court may not have
extended privilege to that relationship.'42 Therefore, communications between
the litigation public relations experts and the lawyers must be to help the
lawyers provide legal services.'43 As discussed earlier in this article, the
parameters of what is considered legal services encompass all communications
with the potential to influence judges and juries, as well as the litigants
themselves.'"
In the privilege context, courts have broadened the definition of what is
considered a link to litigation so that privilege "is not limited to
communications made in the context of litigation or even a specific dispute,
but extends to all situations in which an attorney's counsel is sought on a legal
matter."'45 This is particularly important for companies with a wide-ranging
portfolio of legal issues. The litigations communications privilege discussed in
this article, therefore, should extend far beyond individual cases and individual
trials and include larger litigation issues important to a defendant's docket of
cases.
146
The purpose of media activity for these broader issues, as with case-specific
litigation, is to respond to the media bias and tactics oft employed by the
plaintiffs' bar. 47 For example, companies frequently face a series of lawsuits
on the same issue, such as exposure to a potential toxic substance or failure of
a widely disseminated product. 48 Coverage of the larger issue or public crisis
can define the way the public views the company and its culpability. In
addition, trial lawyers often sensationalize their accusations and exaggerate the
likelihood of recovery when speaking with the media in an attempt to recruit
plaintiffs for copycat lawsuits. 49 It is incumbent on a company, therefore, to
142 Id. at 326.
143 U.S. v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
144 See infra Part V.
145 Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
146 In In re Grand Jury, the court was silent on this issue, as that case dealt with a crimi-
nal investigation and not the challenges of expansive corporate litigation.
147 Courts are less likely to extend privilege when a public relations firm is used as an
offensive tactic in litigation. See Villa, supra note 10, at 91.
148 See, e.g., Dick Thornburgh, Just Say No to Tort Blackmail, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 2002,
at A12 (referring to serial litigation involving DuPont's fungicide Benlate).
149 See Moses, supra note 32, at 1840.
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provide the public with accurate information to assist potential plaintiffs in
making informed decisions about whether to join a lawsuit.5 Corporations
should be able to respond to these common litigation issues, regardless of
whether or not they are tied to a specific lawsuit at the time the issues arise.
In addition, the privilege should cover communications efforts related to the
interplay between business interests and litigation results. This position is not
inconsistent with Calvin Klein, where the court determined that media efforts
directed solely at the effects of the litigation on business and other audiences
and pressures would not be covered. 5' As discussed earlier, this analysis fails
to fully consider the reciprocal relationship between these other interests and
the litigant. Business concerns often have a direct impact on whether and how
companies decide to assert their judicial rights, such as taking a case to trial or
settling out of court, regardless of whether they were legally or morally
responsible for the alleged injuries.'52 After all, companies are structured to
make the right business decisions for its shareholders, even if those courses of
action are at odds with accurate litigation results. Therefore, the course of the
litigation can be determined by how audiences important to a company's
business interests - from consumers to employees to investors - react to media
coverage of the litigation. "'
The plaintiffs' bar understands this nexus and has adopted business pressure
tactics to drive companies to settle suits. 54 It is part of the trial lawyers' triple
pressure point litigation strategy: 1) drive up the cost of lawsuits through
extensive discovery requests, 2) drive down the stock price through
exaggerated claims with Wall Street analysts regarding the financial impact of
the litigation, and 3) vilify the target company or industry to shift public
opinion against the defendant. When the trial bar brought a series of suits
against the HMO industry, well-known Mississippi trial lawyer Dickie Scruggs
explained his use of the pressure point strategy by saying, "In the past, nobody
has communicated directly with investors about the vulnerability of their
money . . .If HMO investors are smart, they'll lean on their companies to see
if we can work something out."'55 During the time Scruggs was meeting with
150 See id.
151 See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
152 See supra notes I and 2 and accompanying texts.
153 See Harlan Loeb, In Long Run CEOs' Drive to Win Suits Can Hurt Firms, CRAIN'S
CFH. Bus., Oct. 16, 2000, at 11, available at www.crainschicagobusiness.com (last visited
Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with author) ("It is critical, for example, to understand the dimen-
sions of a regulatory proceeding or pending case that might be troubling to investors and
consumers.").
154 See Hantler, supra note 2, at 16.
155 David Segal, HMOs Latest to Grapple with Threat of Investor-Scaring Mega-
Verdicts, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1999, at Al.
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Wall Street analysts in the autumn of 1999, the stock of Aetna, a health care
company that runs HMOs, for example, fell by more than 30%."6 As a result,
as Aetna Chief Executive Officer Richard L. Huber observed, "In one day,
more than $10 billion in American savings was vaporized just by the bark of
the wolf."'57
Only through engaging the media to protect their business interests with
respect to the litigation can companies free up their lawyers to focus on making
the right legal decisions, such as which motions to file, which defenses to
assert, and whether to take the case to trial.
B. Structuring the Relationship
A court's decision on whether to extend privilege to litigation
communications efforts also may hinge on the process that defendants and
their lawyers use for governing the relationship with their communications
experts. Aspects of these relationships were widely discussed in Calvin Klein,
In re Copper and In re Grand Jury.
In determining whether the public relations personnel were experts in
litigation communications, Judge Kaplan in In re Grand Jury noted that the
firm was hired specifically for that litigation, and therefore, presumed to be
providing specialized legal related services. ' This situation was different
from that in Calvin Klein, where Calvin Klein used its regular public relations
firm for the litigation, which signaled to the court that the company was likely
receiving general public relations advice."9 This division of labor theory could
cause problems for defendants who work with multi-disciplinary public
relations firms that have litigation communications specialists on staff. If
defendants choose to use those litigation specialists, it may be advisable to
create firewalls between litigation communications staff and the other public
relations personnel, sign a separate contract with the litigation communications
specialists, and hire them through outside counsel.
Also, there may be a higher likelihood that a litigation communications
156 See Stock Chart for Aetna Inc. ("AET") at Fidelity.Com, http://activequote.fidel-
ity.com/rtmews/research-frameset.phtml?page=stocks main.phtml%3Fin-page%3Dcharts.
phtml%26in ticker/o3DAET (last visited November 9, 2004).
"I Segal, supra note 155. Such stock manipulation, particularly when plaintiffs' law-
yers and others team with short sellers, has been called "outsider trading." George Gilder,
editorial, The Outsider Trading Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2000, at A30.
158 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury Wit-
ness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also
United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160-62
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that nonlegal work is not covered by the expert privileges).
159 In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
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expert will be granted attorney-client and work product privileges when
retained by an outside counsel and not by the corporate client itself.6 ° The
court in In re Grand Jury made this point clear, saying it would not have
granted the privilege if the company hired the public relations consultants
directly, even for the same purpose.'6 ' It is important to note that in In re
Copper Market Antitrust Litigation, the court extended privilege to a public
relations firm the company hired directly.'62 In that case, the court reasoned
that the firm was the functional equivalent of an in-house department and did
not undergo the analysis required for non-testifying experts.'63 From a public
policy view, this approach is sound. A corporate lawyer should not have to
hire outside counsel to obtain the privilege.
When deciding whether to apply the privilege to specific work product, a
court may consider whether the work went through outside counsel or was
done in the presence of outside counsel. While the court in In re Grand Jury
said that the outside counsel does not need to be present for every discussion"
in order to maintain privilege, as a general rule, "[w]hen agents are not...
supervised by the lawyer, the privilege is hard to maintain."'65 Therefore, it
would be prudent for a company to have a clearly defined policy regarding the
types of work that are considered privileged,'66 bind their litigation
communications experts to their corporate confidentiality agreement, and urge
them to stamp their documents "Privileged-Attorney Work Product."'67
VII. CONCLUSION
Litigation journalism is a fact of the American judicial system. Ideally,
justice would be served solely based on what is admitted and said in the
160 See generally, United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420, 425 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (not-
ing that where the expert, which in this case was an accountant, "is employed directly by the
attorney the cases appear to extend the protection of the privilege"); EPSTEIN, supra note 88,
at 110.
161 In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 329, 331. In re Grand Jury should not be read to
change the precedent set by the District Judge Swain in In re Copper Market Antitrust
Litig., as Judge Kaplan noted that the legal issues presented to him in the instant case were
different from the ones presented in In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig. Id.
162 In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
163 Id.
164 In re Grand Jury, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
165 EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 115.
166 One of the factors the court in FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline considered in upholding
privilege for the documents shared with the public relations personnel was that they were
made aware of the confidentiality of the documents and understood the importance of keep-
ing the documents confidential. 294 F.3d 141, 147-148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
167 Mark D. Coldiron & Connie M. Bryan, Use of Experts in Environmental Litigation
and Enforcement Matters, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13, 15 (1996).
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courtroom. Unfortunately, "[a] commitment to fairness cannot be ensured by
insulating the legal process from the broader currents of opinion in a society
that is deluged by torrents of information."'68 While some may argue that
litigation journalism "seriously undermin[es] the integrity of our legal
process,"'69 it would be futile to suggest that the United States should regulate
the media coverage of lawsuits, as is done in Great Britain, where the media
cannot report on a trial until after its conclusion. 7' It is understandable that
courts and bar associations would struggle with the issue of extrajudicial
speech and try to keep it out of lawyering. But as long as the courts cannot
control trial publicity, the litigants and their lawyers have a right, and even an
obligation, to engage the media. Litigation communication specialists provide
the expertise to do so effectively. Courts should adopt the holding in In re
Grand Jury and expand on it to include communications made by either inside
or outside counsel so that high-profile defendants can fairly defend themselves
in the court of public opinion and achieve an accurate result in the courtroom.
168 Geri Denterlein, Editorial, The Thin Line Between Law and Public Opinion, B.
GLOBE, July 26, 2003, at A101.
169 Gibson & Padilla, supra note 9 (quoting Carole E. Gorney, The New Rules of Litiga-
tion Public Relations, Public Relations Strategist 1, 24 (1995).
170 Gregg, supra note 45, at 1326.
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